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Chapter 1: Introduction
Migration is defined as the movement of people, either across an international border or
within a State (International Organization for Migration, 2004). There is no universally
accepted definition of a migrant. However, there are characteristics that allow
classifying persons that relocate internationally according to length, composition, and
causes of their movement. Documented migrants are persons that enter in a country
lawfully and remain there legally. Irregular migrants stay in a foreign country without
satisfying legal requirements to do so. Skilled migrants are granted permission to stay
in the host country due to special skills or abilities. Economic migrants leave their
countries of origin to improve quality of life. The latter is commonly used to describe
people that leave their country for the purpose of employment (International
Organization for Migration, 2004).

The tag of economic migrant also applies for those changing of employer, occupation,
and job location, whether within the same city, the same country, or from one country to
another, due to pecuniary reasons (McConell, Brue and McPhearson, 1999). This study
focuses on the workers that leave their home country in the search for better
opportunities in the United States. The United States is selected as benchmark
because its real income is relatively high and draws many migrants to it (Hanson, 2006).

A commonly noted reason for economic migration is the income differential between
source and host regions. Harris and Todaro (1970) develop a model to explain urban
1

unemployment in less-developed countries. The model is based on an income
comparison between rural and urban sectors in a given country and concludes that
migration from rural sector to urban areas will take place while wages in the latter
exceed those in the former. The study concludes that, in the presence of a fixed
endowment of capital and labor, the only solution that leads to full employment in both
sectors is liberalization of labor market since it will allow marginal productivity to
determine wages.

Corden and Findlay (1975) extend the Harris and Todaro (1970) model by introducing
capital mobility among sectors, the possibility of economic expansion, and risk aversion.
It is assumed that even the so-called economic migrants respond to non-pecuniary
incentives when they decide to change residence. The possibility of being hired and the
ability to survive at subsistence levels while unemployed influences the risk aversion of
potential migrants. Those same principles can be applied to international migration
when workers are moving from one country to another, higher income economy.

There are different types of potential regulatory burdens that violate the free market
assumptions in labor market. Examples include the hiring process, work days and
hours, and the cost of dismissing workers. The purpose of this paper is to examine how
labor market regulations may also influence of work migration to the United States. The
assumption is that economic migrants are willing to incur the costs related to a change
of residence if the labor market in the destination country performs better and offers a
chance to improve earnings.
2

There are several studies on related topics that are examined in this study. Section 2
reviews some of the previous migration research. Section 3 of this document
summarizes data employed plus sources. That section also offers an overview of the
econometric model utilized. Section 4 discusses empirical results obtained. Section 5
offers policy implications. A concluding section finalizes the study.

3

Chapter 2: Literature Review
Most of the studies on migration approach the topic as a matter of investment. The
human capital approach described by Sjaastad (1962) is largely employed in related
studies. Both legal and illegal migration are affected by costs and gains associated with
relocation. Factors that increase probabilities of being employed and raising incomes
affect migratory flows positively. Sjaastad (1962) describes economic migration within
the context of income disparities among regions within the United States. Migration
costs and returns are categorized as pecuniary or non-pecuniary. Distance and number
of dependents are among the pecuniary factors. Foregone earnings and psychic costs
are among the non-monetary factors.

Harris and Todaro (1970) study rural-urban migration in Africa. Rural workers relocated
from rural areas to urban areas even when their productivity was higher in their place of
origin. Institutionally imposed minimum wages in urban areas create expected earnings
differentials. Those conditions lead to an equilibrium with high level of unemployment in
urban areas. The analysis employs a two sector model in which both sectors trade
output with each other and the rural sector also exports labor to the city.

An extension of that model is developed by Corden and Findlay (1975). The study
introduces capital mobility and economic growth to explain migration. The research
also incorporates risk aversion in the model. Finally, the analysis eliminates the
assumption of a close economy. It concludes that workers migrate from rural to urban
4

zones when there are expected wage differentials. In this model, migration flows are
positively correlated with the probabilities of being employed in urban areas.

Other studies also utilize to the human capital approach to analyze factors that might
influence decisions to migrate. Yezer and Thurston (1976) employ the job-searching
model to study behavior of migrants within the United States between 1955 and 1960.
Migrated distance is employed in the model as a proxy for information on the destination
labor market. The study concludes that the probability of being hired in a new location,
physical attributes of destiny and origin, and emotional ties might affect the return of
migrants to places of origin.

Greenwood (1985) conducts a survey of studies on migration, primarily within the
United States. Cross-sectional models built with micro data, commonly gathered
through surveys or sampling, dominate among analyzed studies due to a lack of time
series on migration. Surveyed research tends to hypothesize that migration originates
from disequilibria in labor and land markets that correct with migration. Some of the
surveyed research analyzes migration from an individual utility maximization
perspective. Recurrent explanatory variables are related to the stock of human capital,
conditions of labor and housing markets, and environmental amenities. Some other
studies focus on the household as the decision-making unit. Those efforts employ
factors such as birth and aging of children, marriage, divorce, and other life-cycle
variables.

5

Other research employs the human capital model to study the effect of unemployment
on the individual decision to migrate. Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989) present three
hypotheses related to the correlation between unemployment and probability of
migration. First, an unemployed individual is more likely to migrate than an employed
one. Second, there is a positive correlation between migration and unemployment rate
differentials between regions. Third, the correlation between overall unemployment
among a set of regions and migration between those regions is negative. Datasets from
the United Kingdom Labor Force Survey are used to estimate logit regressions for interregional migration in 1977 and 1984. Results confirm the first and third hypotheses, but
empirical support for the second assumption is not obtained.

Gallardo-Sejas, Llorca-Vivero and Gil-Pareja (2006) employ a gravity model to examine
the determinants of immigration into 13 European countries. In addition to traditional
variables such as the size of the economy and distance from origin countries, dummy
variables for qualitative variables such as common languages and maritime links are
included. In the final model, the correlation between migration and population at the
origin is positive, and correlation between migration and distance between origin and
destination is negative. The correlation between GDP at the origin and migration is
positive for lower income economies. The reason for that is that people in poorest
countries do not have access to information from foreign labor markets, and they cannot
afford costs of migration. That correlation turns negative at a certain level of income.

6

Much of the literature suggests that migration is a matter of economic development and
labor market conditions. Some authors have studied the effects of regulatory burdens
on income, economic growth, and unemployment. Fullerton, De León and Kelley (2007)
test the hypothesis that excessive business regulation affects economic development.
A cross-section dataset of 114 countries is developed for the empirical analysis. GNI
per capita is specified as a function of a set of regulatory measures in each country.
Variables employed in the study are reported by the World Bank in the Doing Business
2005 report. The study shows potential gains of $28.8 trillion as a result of at least
partial deregulation.

A subsequent study on the same matter updates the dataset with the World Bank Doing
Business report of 2008. That report includes information on regulatory burdens in 149
countries. New variables for construction licenses, tax burdens, international trade, and
a dummy variable to classify countries by region are included in the analysis.
Somewhat surprisingly, endogeneity is not found to be present in the sample.
Outcomes are consistent with the previous study. Those outcomes show a loss of
$27.83 trillion in the GNI per capita of studied countries as a consequence of the
regulatory burdens (Licerio, Fullerton, and Clark, 2010).

Feldmann (2008) studies the effects of economic regulations on labor markets. The
hypothesis indicates that labor market inflexibility motivates firms to utilize more capital
intensive processes. Components of an economic freedom index are employed as
explanatory variables in a panel model. Unemployment rates are the dependent
7

variables. Results indicate that unemployment in countries included in the sample
would be 280 basis points lower if they adopt more flexible labor market policies. The
study employs the labor market in the United States as a benchmark.

Mexican nationals account for one-third of the 2010 U.S. foreign born population in the
United States. According to Hanson and McIntosh (2010), migrant networks influence
the migration of Mexicans to the United States. Such networks help reduce relocation
costs. Birth cohorts between censuses in the United States and in Mexico are used to
calculate the flow of illegal migrants. Explanatory variables in the model are growth of
population in each state, school attendance in the U.S, and the stock of Mexican
immigrants in recipient states. Output shows that growth of population at the origin is
positively correlated with migration. The results also suggest that preexisting migrant
networks at destination attract more migrants.

Ashby, Bueno, and Martínez Villarreal (2013) study the causes for undocumented
migration flows from the 32 Mexican states to the 50 states in the United States. The
model is specified with distance between states, relative employment growth, earnings
differentials, climate, population, and the existence of immigrant networks as
explanatory variables. A positive correlation is found between migration flows and the
existence of immigrant networks in destination cities. Similar to Gallardo-Sejas (2006),
location choices and distance are negatively correlated. Results also show that wage
levels influence migration patterns as workers tend to migrate to states with higher
wages.
8

Labor force migration has been studied using several different approaches. There is
broad consensus on the causes of migration. Distance between origin and destination,
climate, and other amenities, plus the existence of immigrant networks at destination
are found to influence rates of migration. Some other factors relate to labor market
conditions. Unemployment rates and wage differentials are among these variables.
The influence of labor market regulatory burdens on migration has not been extensively
analyzed. This study attempts to shed light on how labor market inflexibility may affect
migratory flows.

9

Chapter 3: Data and Methodology
In 2010, 1.043 million people from around the world migrated to the United States
(Organization for Economic Co-operation ande Development, 2012). The OECD
collects data by means of correspondents appointed for each of the member countries.
Because these data are mostly obtained from official sources in every country,
undocumented migration might be undercounted. The approach utilized here studies
migration from an investment perspective. Right-hand side regressors reflect the costs
and earnings of migration.

Distance from the country of origin is used as a proxy for the cost and difficulty of
relocating to the United States. Distance is measured in kilometers from the geographic
center United States to the geographic center of each of the 168 countries in the
sample. Distances measuring are obtained from a Web site that measures distance
between two places by using a geographic information system. (DistanceFromTo,
2009). It is expected that people from nearly countries migrate to the United States in
larger numbers.

The World Bank (2012) reports Gross National Income per capita for every country in
the sample. Those figures are expressed in U.S. Dollars at official exchange rates. The
ratio of the per capita income in the United States to the income in each country in the
sample is employed to control for income differentials. The value of that variable is less
than one if the income in the country of origin is higher than in the United States. The
10

ratio is greater than one when income in the country of origin is lower than in the United
States. The assumption is that the larger the ratio of per capita income, the greater the
incentive for an individual from a given country to try to relocate to the United States.

Natural disasters displace a number of persons in the world every year. The United
Nation Development Program reports the annual number of persons affected by a
natural disaster in each of the countries. The definition of people affected by natural
disaster, according to that agency, encompasses people requiring immediate
assistance during a period of emergency as a result of a natural disaster, including
displaced, evacuated, homeless and injured people (United Nations Development
Program, 2012). The variable is expressed in number of persons per 1,000 inhabitants
at the country of origin. The coefficient related to this variable in the model is expected
to have a positive sign.

A Web site dedicated to cataloging languages of the world provides a list of all the
countries in which English is the official or national language (Lewis, Simmons, and
Fening, 2012). The use of a common language is expressed in the specification by
means of a dummy variable, giving the value of one to countries that use English as the
official or national language and zero otherwise. The hypothesis is that people from
countries that speak English as official or national language are more likely to choose
the United States as a destination when to migrating.
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The Doing Business 2011 report released by the World Bank (2012) contains data
describing labor market conditions in several countries and territories during 2010. That
information is employed in the model to control for the influence of those labor market
policies on migratory flows. The hypothesis is that negative effects of regulatory
burdens on income reported by Fullerton, et al. (2007), and Licerio, et al. (2010) will
increase migration to countries with more flexible labor markets. The Doing Business
report divides information on labor market restrictions into four categories: difficulty of
hiring; rigidity of hours; difficulty of redundancy, and redundancy costs. Each of those
categories contains several variables. The sample includes complete information from
166 countries. Bolivia and Venezuela do not have data for some variables due to
domestic legislation. These countries are also included in the sample by assigning
values reflecting the restrictiveness of their labor markets. The final sample size is 168.

The difficulty of hiring category measures the restrictiveness of hiring workers under
fixed-term contracts. A fixed-term contract is defined as a labor agreement that
contains an expiry date or limited duration, even if the employee is performing a
permanent task (World Bank, 2012). Some countries prohibit these kinds of
agreements for workers performing permanent tasks. Most of the countries in the
sample allow temporary employment relationships for non-permanent endeavors, but
limit maximum cumulative durations. Limits on the duration fixed-term contracts include
contract renewals. The countries with restrictions of any kind on fixed-term contracts
are assigned a value of one, the value is zero otherwise. It is anticipated that those
restrictions cause labor market distortions, leading to underemployment and migration.
12

Restrictions on night work are part of the rigidity of hours. That is a dummy variable that
takes the value of one if the country imposes special restrictions on night work, or
obligates the employer to obtain permission from a third party to assign activities to
workers during evening hours. The variable takes the value of zero if night shifts are
allowed without special permission requirements. Such restrictions may impede the
employer from opening additional shifts and making production adjustments.

Another variable included in the rigidity of hours is the number of maximum work days
per week allowed. Most of the countries in the sample allow 5.5 or six days per week.
Having more days per week allows the employer to respond to increases in demand
and permits generate labor force flexibility. Allowing fewer working days per week is
considered more restrictive. Conversely, it is assumed that the larger the number of
mandatory leaves per year in a given country, the more rigid is its labor market

Changes in demand faced by companies might make some activities redundant and, by
extension, some workers. When the law recognizes redundancy as a cause for fair
dismissal of workers, a labor market is assumed to perform better. Redundancy is the
basis on which the Doing Business report calculates the difficulty and cost of dismissals.
Dummy variables are employed to indicate if an employer must notify a third party in
order to dismiss a redundant worker. A value of one is assigned to the countries that
impose such restrictions; zero is used for those that do not.
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A value of one is also assigned to the countries that require permission from a third
party to dismiss a worker. Values of zero are assigned to countries that do not require
that. The model also includes dummy variables for the requirement of engaging with
third parties for collective dismissals. The logic of value assignment is the same; one
for economies that mandate the intervention and zero for those that do not. Similar to
other variables, the presence of a restriction is expected to cause the labor market to
underperform.

Difficulty to dismiss is also measured by the application of special rules to dismiss a
redundant worker. Special rules might apply to dismiss workers under certain
conditions such as seniority or being part of a minority. Existence of that kind of
regulation is specified in the model by using another dummy in which the value of one is
assigned to countries with special rules and zero for those not applying them. The
existence of those rules is considered restrictive and expected to be positively related
with immigration to the United States.

Employers are sometimes obligated to reassign or retrain workers before being able to
declared redundancies. A dummy variable assigns the value of one to countries with
that requirement and zero otherwise. That restriction is also expected to cause
migration.

Dismissal costs under redundancy include the number of weeks that an employer must
wait to dismiss a redundant worker after notification is rendered. The hypothesized
14

value for the coefficient for this variable is positive. The majority of countries in the
sample require severance payments from employer dismissing workers on the
redundancy basis. Severance amounts are usually a function of the length of the tenure
by the employee. Variables employed in the model include the cost of dismissing a
worker with one year of tenure and the cost of dismiss a redundant worker with ten
years of tenure. Both costs are calculated in weeks of salary at the moment of
dismissal.

Mexico sent more migrants to the United States in 2010 than any other country in the
world. Mexico is also the country nearest to the United States. When immigrants are
counted on proportional basis, Guyana leads the sample. The equivalent of 0.9 percent
of that country’s population migrated to the United States during 2010.

The wealthiest country in the sample is Qatar. Per capita income in the United States is
equivalent to the 62 percent of the income in that nation. The economy with the lowest
income is Congo. Per capita income in the United States is 143 times larger than the
income in Congo. 73 countries in the sample reported less than one in 1,000
inhabitants affected by natural disasters during 2010. Swaziland, the highest in the list,
reports 117 out of every 1,000 inhabitants as impacted by natural disasters.

Countries with the greatest percentage of nationals living in the United States in 2010
are led by a group of Caribbean nations. Citizens of Dominica that live in the United
States are equivalent to almost 60 percent of that country’s population. Nine out of the
15

10 nations with the lowest percentage of originals living in the United States in 2010 are
in Africa. None of those 10 countries has a stock of migrants in the United States that
reaches the equivalent of 0.02 percent of its own population. Mexico leads the list of
countries with the larger migrant networks in the United States when counted in
absolute terms (See Annex 1).

Australia, New Zeland, Guyana and other five countries do not impose restrictions on
the number of working days per week. 11 countries have rules that impede employees
from working more than 5 days a week. On average, the number working days allowed
per week is 6. That number is used by most countries in the sample. Eight countries
force their employers to give workers 30 paid annual leave working days per year, the
highest number in the sample. There are five countries in which paid annual leave days
are not mandatory. The mean for mandatory paid vacation time per year in the sample
is 17.44 days.

In some countries, employers must notify redundant workers before the dismissal takes
place. Gambia requires the longest period of time between notification and dismissal.
In that country, the employer has to notify the employee 26 weeks prior dismissals.
Employers are not obligated to notify employees about dismissals in 22 of the countries
in the sample. On average, the countries in the sample require a period of 4.3 weeks
between notifications and dismissals. In Greece, an employer that needs to terminate a
worker on a redundancy basis must pay a severance equivalent to 24 weeks of the
worker’s salary if that person has been with the company for one year at least. Almost a
16

third of the countries in the sample, 50 of them, do not require employers to make
severance payments when they dismiss redundant workers with one year or less of
tenure.

Employers in Sri Lanka are obligated to pay the equivalent of 97.5 weeks of salary as
severance in order to dismiss a worker with 10 years of tenure. That is the highest
amount in the sample and is 4.5 times greater than the value of the sample mean.
Workers with 10 or more years with a company can be released without severance
payments in 34 countries in the sample. Bolivia and Venezuela do not allow dismissing
workers on the base of redundancy. In order to keep those countries in the dataset,
those countries are assigned values greater than the highest in the sample for each of
the variables measuring costs of redundancy. Bolivia and Venezuela are assigned
redundancy costs values that are three percent greater than the highest in the sample.

The United States is employed as the benchmark economy in testing the effects of labor
market rigidities on migration. The hypothesis is that workers tend to move from
restrictive labor markets to less regulated economies where there are better
opportunities to work and/or increase incomes. Variables to control for traditional
causes of migration include distance, income, language, climate, and stock of migrants
are included in the equation.

(

(1)
(

)

)

(

∑
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)

(

)

(

)

In Equation 1, GNI represents the Gross Nation Income Per Capita, DIST distance;
ENG is a dummy variable indicting if English is the official or national language; NATDIS
stands for persons affected by natural disasters per 1,000 inhabitants and STOCK is the
number of originals settled in the United States by year 2010. The sixth term in
Equation 1 summarizes all the variables employed to measure labor market restrictions,
k = 1, 2, 3,…, K for each of the variables describing labor market included in the model.
The suffix US indicates that the variable relates to the United States, while i = 1, 2, 3,…,
168 for each of the countries in the sample. All unobserved variables are included in
the disturbance term

Table 1 contains a glossary of the variables employed. The glossary also provides the
source of each variable. Table 2 lists summary statistics for every series. Several
combinations of variables are also utilized to test for interaction effects. Empirical
results are discussed in the next section.
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Table 1. Mnemonics and Descriptions

Variable

Symbol

Immigrants / 1000 inhabitants

IMMG

Distance from the United States

DIST

English as official or national language
Gross National Income Per Capita
Population affected by natural disasters

ENG
GNI
NATD

Migrant stocks in the US

STOCK

Restrictions on fixed-term contracts
Restrictions on night work
Paid annual leave
Maximum number of working days per week

Unit
Immigrants / 1000 inhabitants
Kilometers

Negative

Dummy
Rate
People / 1000 inhabitants
People / 1000 inhabitants at the
origin

Positive
Positive
Positive

Dummy

Positive

Dummy

Positive

LEAVE

Days

Positive

WDAYS

Days

Negative

Dummy

Positive

APPTHIRDC

Dummy

Positive

PRRE

Dummy

Positive

Difficulty of hiring
FIX
Rigidity of hours
NIGHT

Redundancy Rules
Obligation for the employer to get the approval of a
third party in order to dismiss one redundant
APPTHIRD
worker
Obligation for the employer to obtain approval from
a third party before a collective dismissal
Priority rules applying to re-employment

Hypothesized
sign
Dependent

19

Positive

Priority rules that apply to redundancy dismissals
or lay-offs
Obligation for the employer to notify a third party
before dismissing one
Obligation for the employer to notify a third party
prior to a collective dismissal
Retraining or reassignment obligation before an
employer can make a worker redundant

PRDIS

Dummy

Positive

NOTTHIRD

Dummy

Positive

NOTTHIRDC

Dummy

Positive

RET

Dummy

Positive

Redundancy Costs
Severance pay for redundancy dismissal after 1
year of continuous employment
Severance pay for redundancy dismissal after 10
years of continuous employment

SEV1

Weeks of salary

Positive

SEV10

Weeks of salary

Positive

Notice period for redundancy dismissal

NOTICE

Weeks

Positive

20

Table 2. Summary Statistics
VARIABLE
IMMG
GNI
DIST
NATDIS
STOCK
WDAYS
LEAVE
NOTICE
SEV1
SEV10

MEAN

MEDIAN

MAX

MIN

STD DEVIATION

0.711852
14.69827
9656.149
11.44671
26.93524
5.94369
17.43988
4.31119
3.756131
21.24464

0.11885
6.035
9835
1.7555
3.88
6
18
4.33
2.14
14.2

9.0169
143.36
16849
117.34
582.44
7
30
28
25
100

0
0.62
1634
0
0.05
5
0
0
0
0

1.60125
20.57
3482.292
19.52455
69.01515
0.360297
6.490021
3.921139
4.877029
21.88649
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Chapter 4: Empirical Results
Table 3 presents four different regression equations. Those models include some of the
variables listed in Table 1. The models are specified using two different sets of
variables. Given the differences in the order of magnitude among variables, each one
of the sets is presented in linear and logarithmic functional forms. Because of the
nature of the sample, a test for heteroskedasticity is necessary. The results fail to reject
the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity, so OLS results are reported below.

Equation (1) and (2) include variables traditionally employed in a gravity model: the
migrants from each country already settled in the United States in 2010 (STOCK), the
ratio of per capita income in the United States to per capita income in each country
(GNI), and the distance from each country to the United States (DIST). Those
equations also include one variable from each of the Doing Business categories that
describe labor market rigidity: NOTICE measures the cost of dismissals, LEAVE
accounts for the rigidity of hours, APPTHIRDC controls for the difficulty of firing, and FIX
controls for difficulty of hiring. Equations (3) and (4) exclude those two last variables,
but include the rest.

22

Table 3. Alternative Estimations Outputs
EQUATIONS
(1)
VARIABLES
C
FIX
APPTHIRDC
LEAVE
NOTICE
DIST
GNI
GNI^2
STOCK
R-squared
Adjusted R-squared
F-statistic
DIC

(2)

(3)

(4)

Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
1.2907
2.8657
0.1998
0.2556
1.0863
2.4639
-0.0719
-0.0902
-0.3251
-1.7740
-0.1399
-2.6737
-0.1070
-0.5271
-0.0771
-1.2869
-0.0112
-0.7152
0.1000
1.8317
-0.0160
-1.0412
0.0722
1.3093
0.0143
0.6958
0.0660
1.8961
0.0112
0.5417
0.0646
1.8201
-0.0001
-2.6067
-0.1298
-1.7633
-0.0001
-2.2921
-0.0990
-1.3231
0.0079
0.8432
0.3948
3.6931
0.0069
0.7346
0.3497
3.2291
-0.0001
-0.6008
-0.0565
-2.5811
-0.0001
-0.5802
-0.0486
-2.1820
0.0148
10.0167
0.2589
9.9193
0.0154
10.5984
0.2721
10.2918
0.5779
0.5567
27.2160

0.6587
0.6415
38.3534

0.5675
0.5514
35.2119

0.6362
0.6227
46.9350

489.0268

188.1167

493.1261

198.8057
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The Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) is employed to compare the four equations.
The DIC is a combination of measures of complexity and fit that allows comparing
specifications (Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, and van der Linde, 2002). The DIC for the
linear and logarithmic specifications are computed using the procedures employed by
Xiao, Zarnikau, and Damien (2007). Computed DIC values favor Equation (2). That
specification contains eight variables in logarithmic form. In that model, seven of the
coefficients are significant at the 90 percent confidence level or greater. Two of the
coefficients present signs contrary to the hypothesis.

The results obtained for Equation (2), selected as the benchmark specification, validate
many of the findings obtained in previous studies. STOCK is highly significant in all the
equations in Table 3, corroborating results reported in Hanson and McIntosh (2010).
Migrant networks are a major deciding factor of where people relocate for economic
reasons. Relocation costs might decrease and probabilities of getting a new job
increases in the presence of preexisting migrant networks. Besides, knowing people at
the new country could benefit migrants by providing safety.

The benchmark specification output suggests a positive correlation between the number
of people from a given country established in the United States, and the number of
people from that same country migrating to the United States in 2010. Results show an
elasticity of 0.26, meaning that a 1 percent difference in the STOCK variable for a given
country leads to a 0.26 percent increase in the number of migrants per 1000 inhabitants
moving from that country to the United States.
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The variable GNI, calculated as the ratio of per capita gross national income in the U.S.
to per capita income in each country in the sample, is included lineal and in quadratic
forms. Results show concavity in the function of migration to the GNI ratio. The fact
that coefficients of linear and quadratic specification of the variable are positive and
negative, respectively, validates the poverty factor introduced by Gallardo-Sejas et al.
(2006). The results indicate that migration from countries at the lower end of GNI ratio
increases until that ratio reaches a value of 1.01. After that point, the elasticity becomes
negative and migration to the United States decreases 0.05 percent for every 1 percent
increase in the GNI ratio. These results are consistent with the idea that people migrate
to countries with larger income levels.

The other variable commonly included in migration research is distance between source
and host countries. The coefficient estimated for DIST in Equation (2) says that a 1
percent increase in distance causes migration to the United States to decrease by 0.13
percent. The negative relationship between these two variables reinforces findings in
previous studies on the matter (Yezer and Thurston, 1976).

In Equation (2) distance is

statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level.

The variable NOTICE accounts for the period of time the employer is obligated to wait
after notifying the worker of the dismissal to make it effective. Its corresponding tstatistic value is significant at the 10 percent level. The elasticity of migration with
respect to NOTICE is 0.066. All else equal, a 1 percent increase in the NOTICE term
length leads to an increase of 0.066 percent in migration to the United States.
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The mandatory number of vacation days in each of the 168 countries is included in the
sample to describe the rigidity of hours. The results of Equation (2) indicate that LEAVE
variable is significant at the 10 percent level. Coefficient computed in Equation (2)
describes a 0.10 elasticity of migration to variable LEAVE. With everything else held
constant, migration from a given country to the United States increases 0.10 percent per
every 1 percent increase of the mandatory vacations period in the source country.

Regulatory limits on fixed-term employment relationships are another type of red tape
affecting many labor markets. It is hypothesized to cause malfunctions to the market
and, therefore, increase migration to better performing economies. Results in Equation
(2) do not corroborate the hypothesis, as the coefficient for FIX has a negative sign.
The inverse relationship between migration and term limitation on temporary contracts
might be a consequence of risk aversion. Employed persons might be willing to
migrate, despite their status in the country of origin, if they know that status is
temporary. On the other hand, those under permanent contracts might be less willing to
relocate, despite lower income levels. This result also implies that increased “formal
sector” employment in countries such as Mexico will precipitate lower values of
migration to the United States.

The sign of the estimated coefficient for the variable measuring difficulty of firing,
APPTHIRDC, does not support the hypothesis of a direct relationship between labor
market restrictions and out-migration. The negative sign of this coefficient implies that
the existence of a bureaucratic barrier to dismiss groups of workers might help to retain
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people within a country. The computed t-statistic does not reach the 90 percent
confidence level. The results related to the variable APPTHIRDC are in concordance
with outputs reported in Feldman (2003) in which firing and hiring regulations also fail to
reach significance when used to explain unemployment.

Those two variables with coefficient signs contrary to those hypothesized are excluded
in Equations (3) and (4) for comparison purposes. Eliminating those variables does not
enhance the results and the respective DIC are higher than that for the benchmarking
specification (2). Although labor market efficiency may be reduced and income
performance damaged, risk aversion on the parts of workers potentially reduces outmigration in the presence of these contract term and dismissal regulations.

Different approaches to the study of migratory flows reaffirm the importance of both: i)
distance from source to host countries and ii) income differentials on people’s decision
to relocate. The existence of migrant networks in a country is also confirmed as an
attraction factor for people looking for places where to migrate. Equation (2) shows
that, in the presence of aspects traditionally employed to explain migratory flows, labormarket regulatory burdens affect migratory patterns, even though not always as
hypothesized. According to the results, effects of regulations that increase the cost of
dismissals, and those imposing rigidity of hours foster emigration by causing the labor
market to underperform. On the other hand, limits on a fixed-term employment
relationship seem to help retaining people at their source country potentially due to
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worker risk aversion. The results are unable to establish a strong statistical relationship
between bureaucratic difficulties to dismiss employees and the decision to migrate.

28

Chapter 5: Conclusions
Migration is generally regarded as an investment decision. Factors that affect costs of
changing residence are some of the main catalysts behind relocation decisions. Nonpecuniary factors, such as climate, environmental amenities, and life cycle variables are
also commonly employed to explain migration decisions. Labor market conditions with
respect to: i) real or expected income differentials between source and host countries,
and ii) the possibilities of being employed in the source and in the host country can also
influence the decision to migrate.

A variety of studies quantify the negative impacts of regulatory excess on economic
performance. Some regulatory burdens affect the economy as a whole and worsen
income performance (Fullerton, De Leon and Kelley, 2007; Licerio, Fullerton and Clark,
2010). Burdensome red tape has also been found to hamper labor market efficiency
and lower employment levels below full capacity (Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1989;
Feldman, 2003; Feldman, 2008). Given these issues, migratory flows will potentially
increase to less regulated, better performing economies.

Data from the Doing Business 2011 report is employed to describe labor market
restrictiveness in 168 countries. Four models are specified to measure the effects of
labor markets restrictiveness on migration to less regulated economies. Deviance
Information Criterion (DIC) estimates are utilized to select the best specification for
modeling migration to the United States. Results obtained confirm many of those
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reported in prior studies on migration. The existence of migrant networks at a given
place is highly important (Hanson and McIntosh, 2010). Distance, along with income
differentials, also influences migratory flows (Sjaastad, 1962; Gallardo-Sejas, LlorcaVivero and Gil-Pareja, 2006). Outcomes regarding the effects of labor markets
restrictions on migration are somewhat ambiguous.

Contrary to the hypothesis, restrictions on fixed-term contracts imposed by some
countries seem to discourage migration. That result is potentially due to worker risk
aversion (Corden and Findlay, 1975). Institutional limits on redundant worker
dismissals are not found to affect migration to the United States in a statistically
significant manner. These results complement findings in Feldman (2008), where
difficulties of hiring and firing workers are reported to be unrelated to employment
levels.

Links are found to exist between labor market regulatory burdens and migration in two
cases. Those variables are rigidity of hours, as measured by mandatory vacation time,
and the cost of dismissals. Estimated parameters for both of these regressors are
greater than zero and satisfy the 10-percent significance criterion. Together, these
coefficients imply that countries wishing to avoid unnecessary labor resource losses
might benefit from allowing employers more freedom to adjust payrolls.

This study represents an early attempt to link labor market restrictions to migratory
flows. Subsequent research may be able to add to this area of the literature by
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examining different types of migration. Examples include legal and illegal migration as
well as skilled and unskilled labor outflows. The assembly of time series data would
allow examining how changes in labor market legislation such as that recently adopted
in Mexico can affect migration. Additional research on this topic appears warranted.
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Appendix A
List of countries with the largest migrant networks

Country

2010 Migrant Stock in
USA

Mexico

11,635,995

China

1,736,314

Philippines

1,717,771

India

1,654,272

Viet Nam

1,160,309

El Salvador

1,116,420

Korea

1,050,860

Canada

834,945

Dominican Republic

787,015

Guatemala

753,720

United Kingdom

701,093

Germany

653,968

Jamaica

649,046

Colombia

611,971

Haiti

545,437

Poland

487,934

Honduras

469,202

Russian Federation

421,459

Ecuador

420,751

Italy

400,484

Peru

392,455

Japan

340,393

Brazil

339,141

Ukraine

332,155

Pakistan

288,011

Guyana

263,147

Nicaragua

242,886

Trinidad and Tobago

229,650

Hong Kong (China)

214,572

Nigeria

210,647

Thailand

202,971

Laos

192,978
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Country
Portugal

2010 Migrant Stock in
USA
176,694

Venezuela
Romania

171,891
171,253

Argentina

163,353

France

160,721

Greece

151,239

Israel

149,039

Cambodia

148,774

Bangladesh

148,326

Ethiopia

139,693

Ireland

137,537

Egypt

132,513

Lebanon

130,237

Bosnia and Herzegovina

121,495

Ghana

110,931

Turkey

107,284

Iraq

102,942

Panama

98,009

Chile

93,382

Indonesia

87,530

Netherlands

87,311

Kenya

85,123

Morocco

84,496

Albania

83,018

Costa Rica

82,624

Spain

82,440

Hungary

81,905

South Africa

81,142

Australia

77,619

Armenia

77,208

Bolivia

72,890

Jordan

72,286

Syria

67,370

Liberia

66,652

Afghanistan

61,906

Yemen

58,342

Malaysia

55,007
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Country
Austria

2010 Migrant Stock in
USA
53,738

Uruguay

47,772
2010 Migrant Stock in
USA

Country
Croatia

46,499

Sweden

42,665

Dominica

42,409

Fiji

41,338

Saudi Arabia

40,480

Singapore

40,380

Nepal

39,991

Belize

39,840

Sudan

39,573

Bahamas

37,796

Belgium

34,635

Sri Lanka

34,572

Bulgaria

33,611

Grenada

33,568

Czech Republic

32,071

Denmark

32,020

Belarus

32,007

Switzerland

31,195

Latvia

30,167

Lithuania

27,853

Cameroon

26,912

Norway

26,907

Paraguay

26,121

Slovak Republic

25,356

Georgia

25,310

Moldova

25,280

Kuwait

25,044

Uganda

22,460

Samoa

21,813

Uzbekistan

21,083

Cape Verde

20,855

New Zealand

19,402

Antigua and Barbuda

17,611

Sierra Leone

17,549
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Country

2010 Migrant Stock in
USA

Senegal

16,745

Finland

13,490

Saint Lucia

13,278

Estonia

12,738

Eritrea

12,689

Iceland

12,120

Kazakhstan

11,906

Tonga

11,703

Saint Kitts and Nevis

11,456

Cyprus

11,244

Azerbaijan

9,689

Côte d'Ivoire

9,388

Micronesia

9,228

United Arab Emirates

9,197

Tanzania

8,856

Tunisia

8,480

Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines
Zambia

8,274

Former Yug. Rep. of
Macedonia
Slovenia

7,892

Gambia

7,472

Democratic Republic of
the Congo
Algeria

7,386

Suriname

7,182

Guinea

6,403

Congo

6,150

Angola

5,637

Togo

3,671

Tajikistan

3,545

Mali

3,480

Luxembourg

3,325

Bahrain

3,183

Mongolia

3,121

Kyrgyzstan

3,114

Palau

2,781

Mauritania

2,769

7,905

7,578

7,306
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Country

2010 Migrant Stock in
USA

Rwanda

2,614

Mozambique

2,559

Papua New Guinea

2,268

Qatar

2,237

Malawi

2,188

Botswana

1,922

Mauritius

1,916

Oman

1,644

Madagascar

1,496

Benin

1,415

Niger

1,329

Kiribati

1,248

Namibia

1,205

Burundi

1,187

Seychelles

841

Burkina Faso

810

Swaziland

766

Gabon

600

Guinea-Bissau

562

Chad

488

Bhutan

420

Lesotho

396

Equatorial Guinea

376

Central African Republic

371

Solomon Islands

192

Sao Tome and Principe

68

Maldives

49
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